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Abstract 14 
Within the context of coordination level between state and central government, we develop an 15 
econometric model to estimate the association between income and ambient air pollution, 16 
considering the societal preferences jointly influenced by the citizens and the government. We 17 
obtain empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis that state level coalition government can 18 
effectively improve quality of environment by means of reducing ambient air pollution level. 19 
This impact can be increased or decreased based on the societal preferences of the citizens, based 20 
on the area of inhabitance and irrespective of the choice of pollutants. 21 
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1. Introduction 1 
The association between income and environmental quality in the form Environmental 2 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) has been the research interest for the ecological economists for long. Even 3 
if we leave aside the contextual evidences of EKC hypothesis, the existing body of literature on 4 
this hypothesis has touched upon several significant aspects including need for environmental 5 
quality with rise in the level of income, technological efficiency in determining and maintaining 6 
environmental quality, and impact of the stage of development process on environmental quality 7 
(for a detailed literature survey, see Dinda, 2004). The existing literature on these aspects 8 
majorly focuses on the inverted U-shaped form of EKC, and the hypothesis is formed based on 9 
this form only, as indicated by Grossman and Krueger (1991). Depending on acceptance or 10 
rejection of this inverted U-shape, the association between income and environmental quality can 11 
be determined with contextual interventions. 12 
In accordance with the explanation of the turnaround point of EKC hypothesis, once the 13 
per capita income level reaches a certain point, environmental degradation starts to diminish 14 
because of rising environmental demand and awareness level among the citizens. Even though 15 
this argument seems valid prima facie, it focuses presumably on the consequential symptoms 16 
rather than the original cause itself. Increase in per capita income may not possibly result in an 17 
increase in the level of environmental awareness in an automatic fashion, as it may have been 18 
triggered by any third mediating factor, which is not explicitly described in the explanation of 19 
EKC hypothesis. One such possible construct may be presence of social sustainability aspect 20 
triggered by economic growth. Moreover, considering the democratic political statute of a nation 21 
like India, these factors may bring forth other significant aspects when they interact with the 22 
political regime of the nation. This has been observed by several researchers. Yearley et al. 23 
(2003) have used community mapping exercises in urban centers of three cities in UK, and they 24 
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have found that the participation of native citizens in the environmental policy making can 1 
enhance the efficiency of the local government, in a democratic setting. Sneddon et al. (2006) 2 
has demonstrated the importance of political structures and public participation in determining 3 
the shape of politics regarding environmental policies. Cole et al. (2005) have analyzed the 4 
manufacturing sector of UK during 1990-1998, and they have found that both formal and 5 
informal regulatory pressures can effectively demonstrate the air pollution abatement initiatives. 6 
India is a democratic nation with federal structure and the effectiveness of any policy 7 
implementation depends largely on the level of coordination within the organs of the federal 8 
structure; i.e. between state and central government. There lies the same need of coordination in 9 
case of pollution abatement policy implementation as well. In this paper, we propose an 10 
econometric model to measure the impact of coordination between central and state government 11 
on environmental quality. This model distinctively analyses societal preferences as explanatory 12 
variables for determining environmental quality. The interaction of these variables with the 13 
center-state coordination has been considered as another set of explanatory variables. We 14 
hypothesize that state level center-state coordination can effectively implement pollution 15 
abatement policies at city level, which may not be possible if the state government is not in 16 
coordination with the central government. 17 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes an emission profile of 18 
India, section 3 proposes a framework for empirical estimation for Indian cities, section 4 19 
presents data and analysis, and finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 20 
2. Emission profile of India 21 
Due to rapid growth in industrialization, India has experienced a significant growth in the 22 
fossil fuel consumption. Adverse effects of this growth have been seen in the growth of ambient 23 
air pollution. During the last decade, CO2 emission has gone up by 72%, SO2 emission has gone 24 
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up by 54%, and NO2 emission has gone up by 42% (Lu et al., 2011; Haq et al., 2015), whereas 1 
the particulate matter (PM10) gone up only by 31% and carbon monoxide (CO) by 10% (Masih 2 
et al., 2010; Worden et al., 2013). Therefore, keeping in view the importance and growth pattern 3 
of the pollutants, we have considered SO2 and NO2 emissions for our study. 4 
If we look at the emission affecting tropospheric region, then the NO2 should be 5 
considered as the primary pollutant in this case, as 79% of the tropospheric atmosphere consists 6 
of nitrogen (N2). It is majorly responsible for creation of ground-level ozone, a primary 7 
component of smog (Bower et al., 1994; Shi and Harrison, 1997). It is also responsible for 8 
creation of various nitrate compounds, which add to the level of respiratory particulate matters in 9 
the lower atmosphere (Dockery et al., 1989; Monn et al., 1997; Barnett et al., 2005). Owing to 10 
these reasons, rise in the level of NO2 emission can cause serious damage to ambient 11 
atmosphere. 12 
Looking at the emission affecting stratospheric region, SO2 is considered as one of the 13 
two primary pollutants in this case, as the sulphur aerosols formed in this region are majorly 14 
caused by SO2 emission (Friend et al., 1973; Whitby, 1978; Turco et al., 1979; Surratt et al., 15 
2007). Apart from that, SO2 is soluble in airborne water globules, and thereby, forming sulphurus 16 
and sulphuric acid in the form of acid rains (Penkett et al., 1979). Formation of aerosols after 17 
reacting with particulate matters can create severe respiratory problems (Brain and Valberg, 18 
1979), and even premature births (Hastwell, 1975). Mainly for these reasons, rise in the level of 19 
SO2 emission can cause serious damage to ambient atmosphere, and the human life. 20 
Central Pollution Control Board of India has already set a number of emission standards, 21 
according to which level of SO2 and NO2 emissions should not be more than 40μg/m3 in any 22 
industrial or residential cities of India. Bharat Stage emission standards are also in place for 23 
controlling the vehicular emissions. Presently, Bharat Stage IV has been implemented only 24 
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across 14 cities2 in 2010, and Bharat Stage V is yet to be implemented in 2017. Based on the 1 
reports of Central Pollution Control Board, Supreme Court of India has passed a directive in 2 
2001 for controlling ambient air pollution in 16 cities across India. However, in spite of these 3 
policies in place, SO2 and NO2 emissions across several Indian cities are rising. 4 
3. Empirical framework 5 
The proposed empirical framework is based on a reduced form approach, which does not 6 
incorporate the feedback effect from environmental degradation to economic growth. Adapting 7 
the framework of Panayotou (1997), we assume that effectiveness of any economic policy 8 
depends on collaboration between the ruling parties at state and national level, and therefore, the 9 
basic model of EKC turns out to be: 10                                                                      (1) 11 
Where, for city i in year t, Eit stands for the level of emission, Yit is the level of income at city 12 
level, Popit is the population, and CGit is the indicator of political collaboration between state and 13 
central government. The linear trend variable t is considered as an indicator of technological 14 
change over time, αi are the regression coefficients, εit is the error term, and Ci is the city level 15 
fixed effect. The political collaboration variable CGit has been used both additively and 16 
multiplicatively, in order to incorporate the marginal effects on the emission level. This model is 17 
the basic point of reference for further analysis. It will be used to analyze the effect of 18 
collaborative government on environmental degradation. The direct effects of income and 19 
collaborative government have been disjoined by incorporation of CGit, thereby, capturing the 20 
movement of environmental degradation in response to policy effectiveness. 21 
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To incorporate the social determinants of environmental degradation, Eq. (1) is extended 1 
based on societal preferences, which can be exercised involuntarily or via the political system. 2 
This condition ensures that in a non-cooperative state level political regime, societal preferences 3 
are largely overlooked; whereas, for a collaborative state level political regime, societal 4 
preferences are enhanced and complemented by political statute. Therefore, decomposing the 5 
model in Eq. (1), the extended EKC model becomes: 6                                                                             7                                                            (2) 8 
Where, Genit stands for the gender ratio in terms of number of women per thousand men, ECit is 9 
the consumption of electricity, and LRit is the literacy rate. Interaction between collaborative 10 
government indicator and the societal preferences may affect the nature of EKC curve, which 11 
can bring forth marginal effects in this extended reduced form model. 12 
Once these reduced form models are in place to capture the interaction between 13 
collaborative government and the societal preferences for determining environmental quality, the 14 
influence of collaborative state government on environmental quality is to be analyzed. From Eq. 15 
(1), the association can be explained as (                     ) < 0. Now, this phenomenon can be 16 
analyzed by the collaborative government variable (CGit) and environmental emission variable 17 
(Eit), and by analyzing coefficients in Eq. (2), it can be expected that marginal effect of 18 
collaborative government on emission is negative                                        19                                           . 20 
In order to proceed further with the model, a discussion on the possible effects and 21 
explanations of the societal preferences included in the model follows. Three societal preferences 22 
have been considered, namely gender ratio, electricity consumption, and literacy rate. 23 
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3.1. Gender ratio and environmental emission 1 
Changing role of women in the households and labor force can influence the level of 2 
emission in direct and indirect ways. The level of sustainable development prevailing in any 3 
nation largely depends on the number of women participating in the labor force (Benería et al., 4 
2015), attending the schools (Taskin, 2009), and being engaged in the decision making process 5 
(Rangel et al., 2008). It has been observed that preference over hygienic conditions is more in 6 
case of women, as they are found to be more susceptible towards the diseases caused by 7 
environmental degradation (Miller, 2008). On the flipside of this argument, according to eco-8 
feminists around the world, females experience more proximity to nature compared to males 9 
(Radkau, 2008). Divergence in terms of gendered socialism and the kind of roles to be played by 10 
the two sexes from birth, their perspectives towards the world become radically different from 11 
each other, and in that course, women largely associate themselves with the natural and social 12 
world, whereas men consider themselves as separate and disjoint entities (Coppock et al., 2014). 13 
Empirical studies claim that women are more concerned than men about environmental 14 
quality (Lee, 2009; Rocheleau et al., 2013). Following the trail of Chipko (tree-hugging) 15 
movement, analysis of environment degradation in India perhaps may possibly turn out to be 16 
incomplete without the consideration of the influence of women, as they play a significant role in 17 
protecting the environmental standards in India (Moore, 2008, 2011). Therefore, it is expected 18 
that the gender ratio can play a significant role in determining the turnaround points in the EKCs 19 
for Indian cities. 20 
3.2. Energy consumption and environmental emission 21 
Considering the growth hypothesis approach, energy consumption in any form leads to 22 
economic growth (Akinlo, 2008; Apergis and Payne, 2012) and this phenomenon can be visible 23 
in the context of a developing nation. In this context, Aslanidis (2009) talks about three effects 24 
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working in the background of EKC. Those are scale, composition, and induced technique effects. 1 
Out of these three effects, only scale effect talks about the environmental degradation. Energy 2 
demand rises with growth of industry and nations transit from biomass to fossil fuel, which 3 
results in increased emissions. Pachauri and Jiang (2008) established this association between 4 
change in energy consumption pattern and environmental degradation. They conducted this 5 
comparative study between Indian and Chinese context during 1999-2000 and found out that a 6 
reallocation of energy sources from biomass to fossil fuels leads to lower energy utilization. 7 
Poumanyvong and Kaneko (2010) have also established this association in case of 99 countries 8 
for 1975-2005. They have also pointed out that reallocation of energy sources from biomass to 9 
fossil fuels has increased the emission level. They have attributed increasing emission level 10 
majorly to lower energy utilization. 11 
Apart from focusing only on energy consumption, researchers have discussed about 12 
various sources of energy and the resultant ambient air pollutions. Nordhaus (1977a) has stated 13 
that ignition of fossil fuels brings about emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere and it stays in the 14 
atmosphere for a long while. Owing to the discerning assimilation of emission, the amplified 15 
atmospheric accumulation brings about augmented global temperature. This statement has been 16 
empirically verified by other researchers as well (e.g., Sinha, 2014; Sinha and Bhattacharya, 17 
2014; Sinha and Mehta, 2014; Shahbaz et al., 2015; Sinha, 2015; Solarin and Lean, 2016). Given 18 
the problems regarding the increased industrial heat caused by CO2 emission, Nordhaus (1977b) 19 
has formulated a set of strategies to combat air pollution, like reducing energy consumption, 20 
substitution of carbon fuels with non-carbon fuels, rapid afforestation, and diffusion of CO2 in 21 
the ocean. Nordhaus (1991) has studied the greenhouse effect, caused by amassing of CO2 and 22 
other greenhouse gases, in the context of United States. While presenting several strategies 23 
regarding reduction of greenhouse effect, he has clearly stated his doubts regarding the possible 24 
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policy implications. In accordance with Panayotou (1993), during industrial stage of 1 
development, environmental degradation takes place due to air pollutants, like SO2, NOx, CO, 2 
and Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM). Arrow et al. (1996) have identified two reason behind 3 
this; one, during rapid industrialization stage, furtive users of environmental resources hardly 4 
take care about the implications on social welfare. Two, people, who have just started to get the 5 
benefits of industrialization in material terms are not in a condition to channelize their disposable 6 
income in the direction of environmental well-being.  7 
The researchers have also found out an interesting flaw in EKC hypothesis in terms of 8 
inability of EKC to talk about the transfer of pollutants or trade-off between pollutants inside a 9 
country or among countries (Rothman; 1998; Tzimas et al., 2007; Sinha and Bhattacharya, 2016, 10 
2017). Rothman (1998) has identified that most of the developed nations try to shift their 11 
polluting production base to the poor undeveloped or developing nations; whereas, Tzimas et al. 12 
(2007) have considered this issue while talking about the trade-off situation between SO2 and 13 
CO2, and the cause behind acid gases. Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) have studied an uneven 14 
panel data of 130 countries for the years 1951-1986, and found that the growth in annual 15 
emission level will continue at a rate of 1.8% up to 2025. They have also found that the majority 16 
of world population is concentrated in the countries, where economic growth and CO2 emission 17 
level are growing rapidly. Deviation in economic growth in those countries does not result in dire 18 
transformation in CO2 emission level. Later on, these studies were conducted on specific 19 
countries (Soytas et al., 2007; Zhang and Cheng, 2009). Ozturk (2010) has provided a 20 
comprehensive literature survey on these studies. 21 
Considering this rich volume of literature on the link between energy or electricity 22 
consumption and economic growth, it is expected that for Indian context as well, electricity 23 
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consumption may possibly have a positive influence in determining the environmental emission 1 
level, thereby influencing the turnaround point of EKC. 2 
3.3. Literacy rate and environmental emission 3 
Without a certain level of education, awareness regarding environmental standards and 4 
improvement of environmental quality can hardly arise. Researchers have identified the role of 5 
literacy rate in determining the turnaround point of EKC in several contexts (Li et al., 2007; 6 
Gürlük, 2009; Mostafa, 2010; Khajuria et al., 2011; Orubu and Omotor, 2011). Presence of 7 
educated citizens can ensure a successful public-private partnership to carry out abatement drives 8 
and to be the voice of citizens for collective benefit. Michinaka and Miyamoto (2013) have 9 
provided the empirical evidence in support of the educated citizens’ efforts regarding 10 
environmental protection. 11 
Considering the literacy rate, as a proxy for level of education can bring forth significant 12 
impacts of the EKC models, and in turn it can influence the turnaround point of those EKCs, and 13 
thereby influencing the ambient air pollution levels. 14 
4. Data description and estimation results 15 
Once the theoretical underpinning has been discussed, we can go ahead with estimation 16 
of the regression based EKC models. The data is for 139 Indian cities3 for the duration of 2001-17 
20134. We have collected the annual ambient air pollution data for SO2 and NO2 from the 18 
database of Central Pollution Control Board, and population, literacy rate and gender ratio data 19 
from census of India. For capturing the data for collaborative government at state level, we have 20 
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  85 cities belong to industrial areas and 119 cities belong to residential areas. Central Pollution Control Board, 
India, publishes the segregated emission data for these two areas. Details of these cities are given in Appendix 1E. 
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  During 2001-2013, India has experienced a huge turbulence in the political field, and that too regarding alliance. 
During this tenure, the ruling parties at Central level changed 3 times, and more turbulence has been observed at 
the State Level. Due to several policy level decisions, new parties were formed at the State level, and the alliances 
were made accordingly. Therefore, from political perspective, 2001-2013 has been an interesting tenure for Indian 
politics. 
11 
 
first identified the ruling parties in the respective states for our study period, from the database of 1 
Election Commission of India. Then we have identified their nature of collaboration with the 2 
ruling parties at the national level during the study period. If the alliance was found, value of 3 
CGit was taken as one, otherwise it has taken as zero. For example, Communist Party of India 4 
Marxist (CPIM) was the ruling party of West Bengal till mid-2011, and they used to be one of 5 
the supporters of Indian National Congress (INC), which was the ruling party of India from 6 
2004. However, due to lack of congruence regarding Indo-US nuclear deal, Left Front, the main 7 
alliance of CPIM, withdrew their support from United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which is the 8 
main alliance of INC, in July 8, 2008. For this case, the value of CGit will be 1 from 2004 to 9 
2007, and 0 from 2008 to 2011. Detailed descriptive statistics of these variables are given in 10 
Table 1. 11 
Researchers have identified several problems in the econometric techniques used for 12 
estimating the EKCs, like, serial dependence, stochastic trends in the time series, and omitted 13 
variable bias (Stern, 2004). In this study, we have tried to address some of those problems, like 14 
handling multicolinearity, ensuring stationarity of the data, checking the robustness of the 15 
estimated models. Multicolinearity is a problem with the model, in which the powered terms of 16 
the independent variables are used, and as a result, interactions among those independent 17 
variables increase the level of standard errors for their estimated coefficients (see Appendix 1A 18 
and 1B). In order to handle this issue, the models have been specified by removing orthogonally 19 
transformed independent variables correlating with lower order terms through auxiliary 20 
regressions. Once a specification is chosen, the within model has been tested with the original 21 
data. Before applying auxiliary regressions, stationarity of the data has been checked by applying 22 
LLC (Levin et al., 2002) and IPS (Im et al., 2003) panel unit root tests, and we found all the 23 
orthogonally transformed variables to be stationary at level (Appendix 1C). Once the models are 24 
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estimated, following Barslund et al. (2007), we have checked the robustness of the models by 1 
conducting partial regressions for each of the models for full dataset (see Appendix 1D). 2 
Once the diagnostics tests and transformations were applied on the dataset, we found the 3 
dataset to be free from the errors, the econometricians indicated in the earlier studies. First, after 4 
application of orthogonal transformation and auxiliary regressions, the dataset found to be free 5 
from Multicolinearity and serial correlation. After application of the unit root tests, we found the 6 
orthogonally transformed variables for each of the cases to be stationary at level, and it indicated 7 
that the dataset is free from stochastic trend. Finally, we needed to address the omitted variable 8 
bias problem, which is an inherent problem of a reduced form model, like EKC. By application 9 
of the robustness checking method applied by Barslund et al. (2007), we have found the 10 
estimated models to be robust across the series of partial regressions, and therefore, it can be 11 
inferred that the models are free from the omitted variable bias problem. Now, we can proceed 12 
with analyzing the dataset. 13 
13 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 1 
Area Variable Units No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. CV. 
Industrial SO2  in µg / m3 1105 13.702 8.795 0.642 
NO2 in µg / m3 1105 27.854 14.789 0.531 
Y in Rs. Lacs 1105 9416.416 22320.720 2.370 
Pop  1105 2048788.40 3505110.32 1.711 
CG Index, 0 (non-
collaborative) – 
1(collaborative) 
1105 0.49 0.50 1.020 
Gen No. of women per 
1000 men 
1105 933.884 70.357 0.075 
EC In GWH 1105 1155.911 2469.734 2.136 
LR in percentage 1105 77.614 9.243 0.119 
Residential SO2 in µg / m3 1547 9.228 6.434 0.697 
NO2 in µg / m3 1547 22.744 11.426 0.502 
Y in Rs. Lacs 1547 7888.848 18705.770 2.371 
Pop  1547 1856043.81 3027841.10 1.631 
CG Index, 0 (non-
collaborative) – 
1(collaborative) 
1547 0.53 0.50 0.943 
Gen No. of women per 
1000 men 
1547 939.868 62.359 0.066 
EC In GWH 1547 996.222 2139.684 2.148 
LR in percentage 1547 74.948 9.634 0.129 
 2 
Firstly, the model represented by Eq. (1) has been estimated and the results are recorded 3 
in Table 2. Through this model, an attempt has been made to estimate the EKC for Indian cities 4 
using collaboration between state and central government as an indicator of environmental 5 
quality, and the explanatory power of nation’s political statute for describing her environmental 6 
quality has already been discussed by several researchers (see Dryzek, 2013). By looking 7 
superficially into the results obtained from this model, it can be seen that the signs of income-8 
environmental quality association are almost similar and positive in all the four cases, which 9 
signifies that devoid of any external intervention, it may be hard to improve the level of 10 
environmental quality and therefore, inclusion of political regime is necessary in this context. 11 
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Table 2: Basic EKC model 1 
 Dependent variable 
 NO2 SO2 
 Industrial Residential Industrial Residential 
Y 0.428a (0.102) 0.047 (0.085) 0.251a (0.095) -0.201b (0.086) 
Y2 0.480a (0.072) 0.321a (0.062) 0.153b (0.075) 0.072 (0.067) 
Y3 0.124a (0.040) 0.176a (0.044) 0.058 (0.039) 0.006 (0.044) 
Pop 0.160a (0.047) 0.020 (0.040) 0.135a (0.038) -0.066c (0.037) 
Pop2 0.264a (0.039) 0.196a (0.034) 0.098b (0.042) 0.045 (0.039) 
Pop3 0.170a (0.039) 0.191a (0.036) 0.042 (0.038) 0.003 (0.039) 
CG -0.125a (0.058) -0.128b (0.052) 0.069 (0.057) -0.060 (0.052) 
CG*Y 0.022a (0.007) 0.018a (0.007) -0.007 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007) 
Year 0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.002 (0.007) -0.012c (0.006) 
R2 0.1146 0.1073 0.1380 0.1161 
N 1040 1287 1040 1300 
Cross sections 85 119 85 119 
a value at 1% significance level 
b value at 5% significance level 
c value at 10% significance level 
None of the five regressions in Table 2 support generally accepted inverted U-shaped 2 
form of EKC, even with the intervention of the political regime and the effect of interaction 3 
between political regime and income. Therefore, no turnaround points have been established in 4 
any of the four cases. Emission for NO2 and SO2 in industrial and residential areas show 5 
evidence of cubic and inverse associations with elasticity. These results are supported by 6 
researchers in ecological economics that only income can never result in enhancement in the 7 
environmental quality (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy, 2007; Jackson, 2011). While analyzing 8 
EKC for developed and developing countries during 1979-1999, Lin and Liscow (2013) have 9 
described that interaction between social and political factors have a major role to play in 10 
describing the error terms in EKC estimation. 11 
Looking at the marginal effects of political regime on the environmental quality, in all the 12 
cases, the marginal effect of center-state coordination on air pollution is negative. This shows 13 
15 
 
that center-state coordination has a positive effect on environmental quality (          < 0). Looking 1 
at the marginal effect of interaction between center-state coordination and income on air 2 
pollution, it can be said that collaborative government can possibly ensure green growth, i.e. 3 
environmental quality will improve with rise in income in a collaborative government regime at 4 
state level (               < 0). 5 
Table 3: Extended EKC model 6 
 Dependent variable 
 NO2 SO2 
 Industrial Residential Industrial Residential 
Y 0.516a (0.102) 0.064 (0.084) 0.272a (0.101) -0.144 (0.091) 
Y2 0.395a (0.079) 0.305a (0.065) 0.176b (0.079) 0.078 (0.069) 
Y3 0.145a (0.040) 0.108b (0.044) 0.072c (0.040) -0.008 (0.045) 
Pop 0.161a (0.048) 0.030 (0.040) 0.101b (0.048) -0.089b (0.043) 
Pop2 0.198a (0.044) 0.176a (0.037) 0.114a (0.043) 0.042 (0.040) 
Pop3 0.182a (0.040) 0.127a (0.036) 0.059 (0.039) -0.009 (0.039) 
CG 0.041a (0.013) 0.010c (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 
CG*Y 0.012c (0.006) 0.015b (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) 0.010 (0.007) 
EC*CG 0.010 (0.007) 0.014 (0.008) -0.002 (0.007) 0.019b (0.009) 
Gen*CG -0.024a (0.009) -0.020b (0.010) -0.011 (0.009) -0.005 (0.011) 
LR*CG 0.025b (0.010) 0.005 (0.014) 0.029a (0.010) 0.003 (0.015) 
EC*CG*Y -0.004 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) -0.009 (0.006) -0.013b (0.006) 
Gen*CG*Y -0.007 (0.009) 0.006 (0.007) -0.011 (0.009) 0.014c (0.008) 
LR*CG*Y -0.002 (0.010) -0.042a (0.010) 0.027a (0.010) -0.018 (0.011) 
Year 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) 
R2 0.1526 0.1272 0.1511 0.1430 
N 1040 1287 1040 1300 
Cross sections 85 119 85 119 
a value at 1% significance level 
b value at 5% significance level 
c value at 10% significance level 
 7 
Looking at the marginal effects of political regime on the environmental quality, in all the 8 
cases, the marginal effect of center-state coordination on air pollution is negative. This shows 9 
that center-state coordination has a positive effect on environmental quality (           < 0). Looking 10 
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at the marginal effect of interaction between center-state coordination and income on air 1 
pollution, it can be said that collaborative government can possibly ensure green growth, i.e. 2 
environmental quality will improve with rise in income in a collaborative government regime at 3 
state level (               < 0). 4 
Table 4: Elasticity of variables at sample mean 5 
 Dependent variable  
 NO2 SO2 
 Industrial Residential Industrial Residential 
Y 0.910 2.385 2.989 -0.114 
Pop 5.699 2.373 1.624 0.940 
CG -0.533 -1.428 -0.074 -0.437 
Gen -0.038 -0.010 -0.039 0.052 
EC 0.001 0.007 -0.035 0.009 
LR -0.008 -0.161 0.116 -0.067 
 6 
Table 5: Elasticity of dependent variables with respect to center-state coordination 7 
  Dependent variable  
  NO2 SO2 
 
 Industrial Residential Industrial Residential 
  Y Y Y Y 
  H L H L H L H L 
Gen H -0.514 -0.372 0.007 -0.047 -0.707 -0.450 0.062 0.025 
 L -0.499 -0.362 0.010 -0.045 -0.688 -0.439 0.063 0.025 
EC H -0.098 -0.028 0.255 0.200 -0.569 -0.344 -0.830 -0.450 
 L 0.015 0.023 0.202 0.148 -0.217 -0.131 -0.430 -0.234 
LR H 0.141 0.129 -1.639 -1.015 1.376 0.869 -0.760 -0.460 
 L 0.140 0.126 -1.535 -0.951 1.310 0.828 -0.716 -0.433 
Elasticity is defined as (∆Ei / Ei) / (∆CGi / CGi), with income and preference shifters at 15th percentile (L) and 85th percentile (H) 
Once the basic model has been estimated and the significant impact of coalition 8 
government on environmental quality has been observed, the extended EKC model in Eq. (2) can 9 
be estimated. The estimation results are recorded in Table 3. Further, point elasticities have been 10 
estimated for both the pollutants considering industrial and residential areas. Elasticity values 11 
have been recorded in Table 4 and 5 and demonstrated through Figure 1 to 4. In Table 4, all the 12 
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elasticity values have been estimated at the sample means. In Table 5, all the elasticity values are 1 
relative in nature, and are estimated at the high (85th percentile) and low (15th percentile) levels 2 
of the independent variables. 3 
As per the results reported in Table 3, it can be seen that income-environmental quality 4 
association does not change in any of the cases. The evidence of inverted U-shaped EKC is 5 
missing except the case of SO2 emission in residential areas, where the turnaround point is within 6 
the range of sample. The correspondence of the obtained results demonstrates the legitimacy of 7 
decomposition and the explanatory powers of social preferences in determining environmental 8 
quality are thereby reinstated. Relative elasticities reported in Table 5 are reasonably stable and 9 
marginal effect of the interaction between center-state coordination and income of air pollution is 10 
negative and for center-state coordination is positive in all the cases, just like the previous case. 11 
 12 
Figure 1: Elasticity of NO2 with respect to CG (for industrial areas) 13 
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 1 
Figure 2: Elasticity of NO2 with respect to CG (for residential areas) 2 
 3 
Figure 3: Elasticity of SO2 with respect to CG (for industrial areas) 4 
 5 
Figure 4: Elasticity of SO2 with respect to CG (for residential areas) 6 
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Now we can analyze the marginal effects of the social preferences on environmental 1 
quality. Let us start the discussion with the first social preference parameter, i.e. gender ratio. It 2 
has inverse association with air pollution in three out of four cases at the sample mean. When it 3 
has been interacted with the political collaboration parameter, the coefficients are negative in all 4 
the cases, showing the efficacy of an abatement policy with high percentage of female 5 
population in a city. However, while interacting with income level, the associations are negative 6 
only for industrial areas. This may mean more women joining the workforce can improve the 7 
environmental condition of the industrial areas. However, as indicated by Andersen et al. (2008) 8 
and Veuthey and Gerber (2010), gender ratio can turn out to be unresponsive towards 9 
environmental quality determinations, which can hardly be controlled by government 10 
intervention. Therefore, in the residential areas, the marginal effect of gender ratio, interacted by 11 
level of income has positive association with air pollution, though the point elasticities in this 12 
case are much lower than the previous case. 13 
Next, we analyze consumption of electricity. It has direct association with air pollution in 14 
three out of four cases at the sample mean, which is similar in case of interaction with center-15 
state coordination. However, while interacting with income level, the associations have changed 16 
radically. Apart from the NO2 emission in residential areas, in all the three cases the associations 17 
are negative and it seems that the pattern of energy consumption can be largely influenced by the 18 
political statute of the state in terms of collaboration with the center. Devoid of political 19 
intervention, along with rise in income from industrial growth, change in the pattern of energy 20 
consumption may not seem to be possible. Considering residential areas, NO2 emission can be 21 
caused by vehicular transportation (Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2009), usage of kerosene heaters 22 
(Coria, 2009), usage of grills and cooking facilities (MacKerron and Mourato, 2009), 23 
consumption of tobacco (Kattan et al., 2007), inadequate sanitation facilities (Artés et al., 2009) 24 
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etc, which is hard to control by government intervention only. Therefore, in this case only, the 1 
association has been found to be positive. 2 
Next, we see the final social preference parameter, i.e. literacy rate. It has inverse 3 
association with air pollution in three out of four cases at the sample mean. Only interaction with 4 
center-state coordination may not prove out to be successful in this case, as attainment of 5 
education is directly associated with income level (Kamanga et al., 2009; Welsch, 2009). 6 
Therefore, interaction with level of income is significant in this case. However, relative point 7 
elasticities suggest that the negative effect of this interaction on air pollution level is visible only 8 
in case of residential areas. For industrial areas, this association is positive and comparable to 9 
that of the values in residential areas in absolute terms. By analyzing the structure of cities 10 
pertaining to industrial areas, it can be seen that due to rapid industrialization, several slum areas 11 
were formed around the industrial belts. Slum-dwellers’ daily existence called for direct and 12 
derived demand of fossil fuel consumption and this lifestyle pattern resulted in increased 13 
emission in the industrial regions of India. Inhabitants of these areas are majorly marginal labors, 14 
who have a very low level of disposable income and educational attainment may be a luxury for 15 
them (Newman et al., 2008). 16 
5. Conclusions 17 
This paper studies environmental quality as a consequence of coordination between the 18 
central and state governments, which is important for a federally structured nation. Taking the 19 
other relevant explanatory variables into account, this paper proposes two models: basic with 20 
societal variables and extended with role of political regime included. The paper first analyzes 21 
the association between income and ambient air pollution for 139 Indian cities during 2001-22 
2013. It is found that an inverted U-shaped EKC is not necessary as the political regime of a state 23 
is capable of determining environmental quality of a city. Effectiveness of center-state 24 
21 
 
coordination is found to be relevant, when societal preference parameters were interacted 1 
through it. Combined results of both the models suggest that presence of center-state 2 
coordination and the interaction of societal preferences with political regime can improve 3 
environmental quality. 4 
There are few limitations of this study. In this study, we have gathered the annual average 5 
pollution data for the cities. In order to bring forth more effectiveness, spatial distribution of the 6 
emission data could have been used, and for mapping the air pollution, interpolation methods 7 
like, inverse distance weighting (IDW) or kriging might be used. This might provide a better 8 
measure of the air pollution measures. Bringing forth caveats regarding the non-randomized 9 
distribution of gender ratio and literacy rate across the cities can enrich the study by controlling 10 
the selection bias problem, which has not been addressed in this study. Lastly, considering 11 
household level aggregate survey data can bring forth more insights regarding the turnaround 12 
points of the EKC. These are some shortcomings of the study, which can be used for further 13 
research in this area. 14 
Apart from the aforementioned points, further research in this area can be taken up by 15 
considering the city level municipal government regimes and actual policies. Analysis of the 16 
feedback effect from environmental pollution to income level considering additional explanatory 17 
variables can bring forth more significant insights regarding impact political dimensions on 18 
environmental quality, considering the case of Indian political statute. 19 
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Appendix 1A: Correlations among variables (for NO2 emissions) 1 
 Y Y2 Y3 Pop Pop2 Pop3 CG Y*CG EC*CG Gen*CG LR*CG EC*CG*Y Gen*CG*Y LR*CG*LY NO2 
For Industrial area 
Y 1.000               
Y2 0.987 1.000              
Y3 0.956 0.990 1.000             
Pop 0.965 0.947 0.911 1.000            
Pop2 0.965 0.959 0.933 0.997 1.000           
Pop3 0.959 0.964 0.948 0.987 0.997 1.000          
CG 0.146 0.156 0.164 0.075 0.081 0.086 1.000         
Y*CG 0.369 0.384 0.390 0.295 0.302 0.307 0.948 1.000        
EC*CG 0.427 0.442 0.448 0.358 0.364 0.369 0.909 0.991 1.000       
Gen*CG 0.144 0.154 0.160 0.072 0.078 0.083 1.000 0.947 0.907 1.000      
LR*CG 0.156 0.167 0.174 0.082 0.088 0.094 0.999 0.952 0.913 0.999 1.000     
EC*CG*Y 0.533 0.562 0.578 0.463 0.476 0.486 0.809 0.950 0.975 0.807 0.816 1.000    
Gen*CG*Y 0.366 0.381 0.386 0.292 0.299 0.303 0.949 1.000 0.991 0.948 0.953 0.948 1.000   
LR*CG*LY 0.376 0.392 0.399 0.300 0.308 0.313 0.943 0.999 0.991 0.943 0.949 0.952 0.999 1.000  
NO2 0.132 0.164 0.189 0.125 0.147 0.168 0.004 0.034 0.050 -0.002 0.002 0.078 0.027 0.031 1.000 
For Residential area 
Y 1.000               
Y2 0.990 1.000              
Y3 0.964 0.992 1.000             
Pop 0.951 0.930 0.896 1.000            
Pop2 0.954 0.943 0.918 0.997 1.000           
Pop3 0.951 0.950 0.934 0.988 0.997 1.000          
CG 0.213 0.224 0.229 0.128 0.132 0.136 1.000         
Y*CG 0.424 0.438 0.443 0.329 0.336 0.340 0.955 1.000        
EC*CG 0.478 0.493 0.497 0.385 0.392 0.396 0.922 0.993 1.000       
Gen*CG 0.213 0.223 0.227 0.126 0.131 0.134 1.000 0.955 0.921 1.000      
LR*CG 0.216 0.227 0.232 0.128 0.133 0.137 0.999 0.955 0.921 0.999 1.000     
EC*CG*Y 0.584 0.609 0.621 0.487 0.499 0.508 0.830 0.955 0.978 0.829 0.830 1.000    
Gen*CG*Y 0.423 0.437 0.441 0.327 0.334 0.338 0.955 1.000 0.993 0.955 0.956 0.954 1.000   
LR*CG*LY 0.426 0.440 0.445 0.329 0.336 0.341 0.953 0.999 0.991 0.953 0.955 0.954 0.999 1.000  
NO2 0.129 0.138 0.146 0.146 0.158 0.169 -0.082 -0.056 -0.048 -0.086 -0.076 -0.021 -0.060 -0.050 1.000 
 2 
 3 
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Appendix 1B: Correlations among variables (for SO2 emissions) 1 
 Y Y2 Y3 Pop Pop2 Pop3 CG Y*CG EC*CG Gen*CG LR*CG EC*CG*Y Gen*CG*Y LR*CG*LY SO2 
For Industrial area 
Y 1.000               
Y2 0.987 1.000              
Y3 0.956 0.990 1.000             
Pop 0.965 0.947 0.911 1.000            
Pop2 0.965 0.959 0.933 0.997 1.000           
Pop3 0.959 0.964 0.948 0.987 0.997 1.000          
CG 0.146 0.156 0.164 0.075 0.081 0.086 1.000         
Y*CG 0.369 0.384 0.390 0.295 0.302 0.307 0.948 1.000        
EC*CG 0.427 0.442 0.448 0.358 0.364 0.369 0.909 0.991 1.000       
Gen*CG 0.144 0.154 0.160 0.072 0.078 0.083 1.000 0.947 0.907 1.000      
LR*CG 0.156 0.167 0.174 0.082 0.088 0.094 0.999 0.952 0.913 0.999 1.000     
EC*CG*Y 0.533 0.562 0.578 0.463 0.476 0.486 0.809 0.950 0.975 0.807 0.816 1.000    
Gen*CG*Y 0.366 0.381 0.386 0.292 0.299 0.303 0.949 1.000 0.991 0.948 0.953 0.948 1.000   
LR*CG*LY 0.376 0.392 0.399 0.300 0.308 0.313 0.943 0.999 0.991 0.943 0.949 0.952 0.999 1.000  
SO2 -0.124 -0.095 -0.068 -0.130 -0.114 -0.098 0.018 -0.023 -0.022 0.014 0.015 -0.036 -0.027 -0.026 1.000 
For Residential area 
Y 1.000               
Y2 0.989 1.000              
Y3 0.962 0.991 1.000             
Pop 0.953 0.932 0.897 1.000            
Pop2 0.956 0.945 0.919 0.997 1.000           
Pop3 0.952 0.952 0.935 0.988 0.997 1.000          
CG 0.197 0.211 0.218 0.114 0.119 0.124 1.000         
Y*CG 0.419 0.436 0.442 0.327 0.334 0.339 0.951 1.000        
EC*CG 0.477 0.494 0.499 0.386 0.394 0.398 0.916 0.993 1.000       
Gen*CG 0.196 0.210 0.217 0.113 0.118 0.122 1.000 0.951 0.915 1.000      
LR*CG 0.201 0.215 0.223 0.116 0.122 0.126 0.999 0.952 0.916 0.999 1.000     
EC*CG*Y 0.583 0.610 0.623 0.489 0.502 0.511 0.821 0.954 0.978 0.820 0.822 1.000    
Gen*CG*Y 0.419 0.435 0.440 0.326 0.333 0.337 0.952 1.000 0.992 0.952 0.952 0.953 1.000   
LR*CG*LY 0.422 0.439 0.445 0.328 0.336 0.341 0.949 0.999 0.991 0.949 0.952 0.953 0.999 1.000  
SO2 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 -0.034 -0.030 -0.025 -0.014 -0.027 -0.023 -0.017 -0.011 -0.035 -0.030 -0.024 1.000 
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Appendix 1C: Results of unit root tests on orthogonally transformed variables 1 
 
Variables 
LLC IPS 
Without Trend With Trend Without Trend With Trend 
In
du
str
ia
l a
re
a 
Y -16.2965a -6.8163a -37.5030a -26.8551a 
Y2 -5.5158a -11.6618a -32.7814a -26.6830a 
Y3 -9.1848a -8.9591a -54.3925a -29.4724a 
Pop -14.3427a -7.3552a -26.8843a -23.1144a 
Pop2 -12.4674a -13.6498a -37.2434a -27.2680a 
Pop3 -15.4992a -9.9858a -46.6287a -36.4835a 
CG -10.4185a -11.4940a -5.5967a -5.8406a 
Y*CG -8.4117a -11.6301a -3.9367a -5.3428a 
EC*CG -13.6024a -13.7469a -3.1207a -6.5853a 
Gen*CG -9.5367a -12.5693a -4.1638a -6.4060a 
LR*CG -8.5379a -12.5208a -5.0757a -7.2171a 
EC*CG*Y -8.8982a -11.9333a -5.9461a -6.1616a 
Gen*CG*Y -5.6859a -8.5212a -1.4848c -5.3255a 
LR*CG*LY -6.1649a -9.5937a -1.9757b -5.1033a 
SO2 -8.0513a -12.6177a -5.8129a -9.6686a 
NO2 -9.4581a -12.1006a -6.7817a -10.4469a 
  Without Trend With Trend Without Trend With Trend 
Re
si
de
nt
ia
l a
re
a 
Y -8.0993a -17.6492a -42.3210a -30.0741a 
Y2 -7.5079a -13.9121a -52.2443a -45.8173a 
Y3 -8.9135a -13.5671a -45.8662a -29.2544a 
Pop -16.5065a -9.3415a -43.8224a -32.1782a 
Pop2 -11.6594a -12.7653a -47.2210a -42.8784a 
Pop3 -13.3132a -13.1806a -36.3002a -30.3592a 
CG -11.2140a -11.8815a -6.3687a -6.1872a 
Y*CG -5.8658a -14.2516a -3.3751a -3.2930a 
EC*CG -20.9726a -17.0788a -6.4829a -6.4880a 
Gen*CG -10.1852a -14.5125a -4.5423a -7.3767a 
LR*CG -5.5467a -12.1731a -2.7735a -7.8812a 
EC*CG*Y -10.9359a -12.1758a -5.9138a -6.6077a 
Gen*CG*Y -5.1000a -11.3623a -2.5335a -7.4817a 
LR*CG*LY -7.0167a -11.5350a -2.6795a -5.5166a 
SO2 -12.0099a -15.8957a -6.4437a -10.4660a 
NO2 -9.9455a -15.0488a -4.0390a -5.2182a 
a Value at 1% significance level 
b Value at 5% significance level 
c Value at 10% significance level 
For IPS test, W-t-bar values are reported 
For LLC test, Adjusted t-statistics are reported 
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Appendix 1D: Robustness check for the estimated models 1 
  For NO2 Emissions For SO2 Emissions 
  Control Variables Testing Variables Control Variables Testing Variables 
  Y Y2 Y3 Pop Pop2 Pop3 CG Y Y2 Y3 Pop Pop2 Pop3 CG 
In
du
st
ria
l a
re
a
 
Regression 1 0.1793 -0.0011 0.0013  .  .  .  . -0.6824 0.0573 -0.0013  .  .  .  . 
Regression 2 0.2047 -0.0021 0.0014 0.0321  .  .  . -0.6691 0.0578 -0.0013 -0.0167  .  .  . 
Regression 3 0.1931 -0.0063 0.0015 0.0025 0.0025  .  . -0.6814 0.0576 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0002  .  . 
Regression 4 0.9371 -0.0997 0.0031 0.9393 0.0758  .  . -0.2684 0.0235 -0.0007 -0.7086 -0.0266  .  . 
Regression 5 0.1638 -0.0106 0.0016 0.0002  . 0.0002  . -0.6812 0.0566 -0.0013 -0.0000  . 0.0000  . 
Regression 6 0.7978 -0.0767 0.0020 1.0140  . 0.0020  . -0.3129 0.0312 -0.0011 -0.3885  . 0.0007  . 
Regression 7 0.6335 -0.0508 0.0008  . 0.0820 0.0042  . -0.3724 0.0410 -0.0016  . -0.0317 0.0016  . 
Regression 8 0.2275 -0.0085 0.0019 0.2373 0.2583 0.0087  . -0.6287 0.0785 -0.0033 -1.4122 -0.1431 0.0044  . 
Regression 9 0.1733 -0.0022 0.0014  .  .  . -0.0421 -0.6870 0.0581 -0.0013  .  .  . 0.0325 
Regression 10 0.1914 -0.0027 0.0014 0.0220  .  . -0.0372 -0.6800 0.0583 -0.0013 -0.0084  .  . 0.0306 
Regression 11 0.1873 -0.0064 0.0015 0.0022 0.0022  . -0.0294 -0.6880 0.0577 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0002  . 0.0334 
Regression 12 0.9461 -0.1000 0.0032 0.9434 0.0757  . -0.0330 -0.2772 0.0238 -0.0007 -0.7046 -0.0268  . 0.0321 
Regression 13 0.1616 -0.0105 0.0016 0.0002  . 0.0002 -0.0224 -0.6848 0.0565 -0.0013 -0.0000  . 0.0000 0.0361 
Regression 14 0.8059 -0.0770 0.0020 1.0193  . 0.0020 -0.0313 -0.3214 0.0315 -0.0011 -0.3829  . 0.0007 0.0327 
Regression 15 0.6396 -0.0509 0.0008  . 0.0823 0.0042 -0.0299 -0.3793 0.0411 -0.0016  . -0.0314 0.0016 0.0333 
Regression 16 0.2520 -0.0057 0.0018 0.1325 0.2503 0.0085 -0.0264 -0.6618 0.0824 -0.0035 -1.5544 -0.1539 0.0047 0.0358 
  For NO2 Emissions For SO2 Emissions 
Re
si
de
n
tia
l a
re
a
 
Regression 1 0.7696 -0.1107 0.0052  .  .  .  . 0.7683 -0.1109 0.0050  .  .  .  . 
Regression 2 0.5433 -0.0955 0.0047 0.1021  .  .  . 0.9787 -0.1228 0.0054 -0.1140  .  .  . 
Regression 3 0.5790 -0.1000 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048  .  . 0.8869 -0.1157 0.0052 -0.0037 -0.0037  .  . 
Regression 4 2.1311 -0.2404 0.0082 0.0997 0.0834  .  . 1.7124 -0.1870 0.0067 -1.2715 -0.0440  .  . 
Regression 5 0.6181 -0.1033 0.0048 0.0003  . 0.0003  . 0.8315 -0.1127 0.0052 -0.0002  . 0.0002  . 
Regression 6 1.9273 -0.2105 0.0068 1.0544  . 0.0022  . 1.6575 -0.1756 0.0061 -0.7638  . 0.0012  . 
Regression 7 1.7090 -0.1794 0.0054  . 0.0831 0.0043  . 1.5495 -0.1568 0.0051  . -0.0637 0.0030  . 
Regression 8 1.3110 -0.1254 0.0031 0.7503 0.2183 0.0078  . 0.2081 -0.0293 0.0031 -0.5231 -0.5702 0.0159  . 
Regression 9 0.7311 -0.1061 0.0051  .  .  . -0.1251 0.7608 -0.1100 0.0050  .  .  . -0.0186 
Regression 10 0.5692 -0.0954 0.0047 0.0753  .  . -0.1086 0.9810 -0.1218 0.0054 -0.1251  .  . -0.0455 
Regression 11 0.5864 -0.0984 0.0048 0.0038 0.0038  . -0.1020 0.8829 -0.1142 0.0052 -0.0041 -0.0041  . -0.0431 
Regression 12 2.0960 -0.2352 0.0081 0.0437 0.0805  . -0.0871 1.6949 -0.1845 0.0067 -1.2494 -0.0428  . -0.0333 
Regression 13 0.6136 -0.1009 0.0047 0.0002  . 0.0002 -0.0957 0.8237 -0.1111 0.0052 -0.0002  . 0.0002 -0.0396 
Regression 14 1.8994 -0.2064 0.0067 1.0352  . 0.0021 -0.0861 1.6431 -0.1736 0.0061 -0.7563  . 0.0012 -0.0319 
Regression 15 1.6847 -0.1759 0.0054  . 0.0815 0.0042 -0.0855 1.5368 -0.1551 0.0051  . -0.0631 0.0029 -0.0311 
Regression 16 1.3103 -0.1251 0.0032 0.6474 0.2088 0.0075 -0.0849 0.2011 -0.0302 0.0031 -0.4991 -0.5678 0.0158 -0.0293 
Note: Robustness of the models for full dataset is ensured, as the coefficient signs of core variables remain unchanged. 
  2 
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Appendix 1E: Profile of the cities considered for the study 1 
Northern zone cities Southern zone cities 
Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) 
Agra R & I 4028.00 2757.73 Alappuzha R & I 46.18 1183.72 
Allahabad R 70.50 1969.87 Bangalore R & I 741.00 27833.29 
Amritsar R & I 2683.00 5120.72 Belgaum I 94.00 2104.68 
Anpara I 179.00 33.09 Chennai R & I 426.00 35175.94 
Bathinda I 210.00 1199.01 Chittoor I 95.97 16345.00 
Chandigarh I 114.00 11545.39 Coimbatore R & I 246.80 8484.66 
Delhi R & I 1484.00 141540.54 Gulbarga R 64.00 1849.82 
Dera Baba Nanak R 74.00 30.75 Guntur R 230.00 29531.17 
Dera Bassi I 157.00 104.14 Hassan R 6814.00 584.94 
Faridabad R & I 2151.00 6891.56 Hubli-Dharwad R & I 404.00 3257.90 
Firozabad R & I 2362.00 933.02 Hyderabad R & I 217.00 23908.91 
Gajraula R & I 3.00 85.20 Kakinada R 31.51 2380.17 
Ghaziabad I 133.30 3255.79 Khammam R 94.37 16931.76 
Gobindgarh R & I 110.00 342.37 Kochi R & I 732.00 8865.43 
Hisar R 215.00 1550.41 Kollam R & I 73.03 4193.20 
Jalandhar R & I 3401.00 3742.07 Kottayam R & I 2208.00 1418.18 
Jhansi R 5028.00 883.88 Kozhikode R & I 128.00 7912.58 
Kanpur R & I 403.70 4860.48 Kurnool R 65.91 24195.29 
Khanna R & I 28.00 546.07 Madurai R & I 243.00 6074.51 
Khurja R & I 142.00 218.19 Malappuram I 33.61 5852.29 
Lucknow R & I 2528.00 4575.94 Mangalore I 184.45 2175.75 
Ludhiana R & I 310.00 7041.89 Mysore I 132.00 3390.89 
Meerut R 141.90 2275.02 Nalgonda R 105.00 21183.45 
Naya Nangal R 79.00 216.13 Nellore R 48.39 17839.74 
Noida R & I 203.00 898.82 Palakkad I 1363.00 1240.79 
Patiala R & I 339.90 1849.33 Patancheru R 122.00 18160.77 
Varanasi R 1550.00 2311.78 Pathanamthitta R 23.50 176.15 
Yamunanagar I 255.00 1697.51 Salem R 124.00 3800.27 
Eastern zone cities Thoothukudi R & I 50.66 1586.06 
Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) Thrissur R 101.40 6607.24 
Angul R & I 6232.00 101.51 Trivandrum R & I 214.90 6772.38 
Asansol I 127.30 3483.23 Vijayawada R & I 61.88 7465.44 
Balasore R 3076.00 413.54 Visakhapatnam R & I 540.00 25727.63 
Berhampur R 86.82 825.29 Warangal R 407.80 21277.51 
Bhubaneshwar R 135.00 1972.63 Western zone cities 
Cuttack R 398.00 1545.48 Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) 
Dhanbad R 2052.00 2579.06 Ahmedabad R & I 464.00 28261.90 
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Durgapur (WB) R & I 154.00 1622.43 Alwar R & I 150.00 802.27 
Haldia I 162.00 560.93 Amravati R & I 122.00 3261.53 
Howrah R & I 1467.00 13675.52 Anklesvar R & I 213.00 638.82 
Jamshedpur I 209.00 2828.23 Aurangabad (MS) R 139.00 5828.57 
Jharia I 280.00 209.68 Chandrapur R & I 77.00 1641.59 
Kolkata R & I 185.00 40475.25 Greater Mumbai I 4355.00 65021.10 
Patna R 3202.00 2063.98 Jaipur R & I 111.80 7115.57 
Ranchi R 175.00 2324.72 Jamnagar R 53.30 2849.73 
Rayagada R & I 7073.00 162.13 Jodhpur R & I 78.60 2653.26 
Rourkela R 340.00 1283.99 Kolhapur R 66.82 2875.63 
Sambalpur R 6702.70 613.82 Kota R & I 318.00 2291.08 
Sindri I 65.00 196.50 Lote R & I 144.00 277.01 
Talcher I 2025.00 94.34 Mahad R & I 175.00 140.17 
Central zone cities Mumbai R & I 603.00 93969.58 
Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) Nagpur R & I 217.60 12603.27 
Bhilai Nagar R & I 45.20 2574.87 Nashik R & I 360.00 7604.93 
Bhopal R & I 285.90 3695.98 Navi Mumbai R & I 344.00 855.59 
Dewas R & I 535.00 572.51 Pune R & I 700.00 24672.11 
Gwalior R 780.00 2191.14 Rajkot R & I 170.00 6200.10 
Indore R & I 530.00 4139.85 Roha R & I 120.00 107.19 
Jabalpur R 367.00 2563.17 Sangli R & I 118.20 2608.01 
Khajuraho R 175.00 48.21 Solapur R & I 148.90 4895.32 
Korba R 316.00 881.79 Surat R & I 326.50 19780.00 
Nagda R & I 120.00 208.66 Tarapur I 627.00 36.78 
Raipur R & I 226.00 2493.15 Thane R & I 147.00 53789.04 
Sagar R 6375.00 740.34 Udaipur R & I 37.00 1130.71 
Satna R & I 200.00 561.41 Vadodara R & I 235.00 8368.20 
Singrauli R 2200.00 441.38 Vapi R & I 425.89 665.21 
Ujjain R & I 152.00 1031.14     
North-Eastern zone cities 
Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) Cities Category Area (in km2) Average Income (in Rs. Lacs) 
Bongaigaon R 6.00 1462.12 Nagaon R 128.00 5572.44 
Daranga R 78.00 1831.42 Nalbari R 160.00 1558.21 
Dibrugarh R 66.14 2670.31 North Lakhimpur Town R 15.00 2077.97 
Golaghat R 3502.00 2149.91 Sibsagar R 2667.70 2340.84 
Guwahati R 215.00 1904.49 Silchar R 15.75 341.35 
Hailakandi R 1327.00 1302.50 Tezpur R 40.00 139.26 
Margherita R 162.00 54.36 Tinsukia R 3791.00 2658.54 
 
Note: “R” signifies Residential; “I” signifies Industrial; “R & I” signifies Residential and Industrial 
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